In China, between 1978 and 1995, energy use per unit of GDP fell by 55%. There has been considerable debate about the major factors responsible for this dramatic decline in the energyoutput ratio. In this paper we use the two most recent input-output tables to decompose the reduction in energy use into technical change and various types of structural change, including changes in the quantity and composition of imports and exports. In performing our analysis we are forced to deal with a number of problems with the relevant Chinese data and introduce some simple adjustments to improve the consistency of the input-output tables. Our main conclusion is that between 1987 and 1992, technical change within sectors accounted for most of the fall in the energy-output ratio. Structural change actually increased the use of energy. An increase in the import of some energy-intensive products also contributed to the decline in energy intensity.
I. Introduction
In China, between 1978 and 1995, reported energy use per yuan of GDP fell by 55%.
Given the importance of fossil fuel use in the generation of local and regional air pollution and in the emission of the greenhouse gasses linked to climate change, this fall in the energy-output ratio has considerable importance for both China and the global environment. Given China's rapid rate of economic growth during this same period, the decline in the energy-output ratio is even more significant. There has been considerable debate about the major factors causing the decline in the energy-output ratio. In general, the debate centers around the relative roles of technical change within individual sectors and structural change between sectors. Answers to the questions central to this debate are important for the design of both energy and environmental policy.
In this paper we examine the decline in the energy-GDP ratio over the 1987-92 period using decomposition analysis based on the two most recent input-output tables for China.
However, in performing our analysis we are forced to deal with a number of problems with the relevant Chinese data. In particular, as is common in economies undergoing a rapid transition, the input-output tables become incompatible across time as the organization of production changes. In the case of China, a major cause of this phenomenon is that firms have been becoming increasingly specialized and less vertically integrated. Therefore, we try to address these problems by introducing a method to adjust the input-output tables to reconcile conflicting value, price, and physical quantity data. We also perform sensitivity analysis using alternative estimates of the rate of inflation. Our main conclusion is that between 1987 and 1992, technical change within sectors, at the 2-digit level, accounted for most of the fall in the energy-output ratio. Structural change actually increased the use of energy. An increase in the import of some energy-intensive products also contributed to the decline in energy intensity.
In the second part of this paper we review some recent studies on changes in the energyoutput ratio in China and try to clarify the reasons for the apparent disagreements. In the third section, we discuss some problems with the relevant Chinese data. In the fourth section, we describe our methodology for constructing a consistent set of input-output tables. In the fifth section, we describe our decomposition methodology. The results of the decomposition analysis are presented in the sixth section. In the seventh section we discuss the effects of assuming different rates of inflation in our decompositions. Some conclusions are presented in the final section. Figure 1 shows the energy-GDP ratio for China for the years 1953 to 1995. The ratio rose after 1953, then shot upward due to the drastic declines in output associated with the "Great Leap Forward" . It returned to its previous trajectory in 1967 and then rose fairly steadily for the next ten years. Starting in 1978 and coinciding with the economic reforms pioneered by Deng Xiaoping, the ratio began to decline. In this section of the paper we briefly review previous work on the decline in the energy-output ratio after 1977 and point out how some of the controversy over the causes of this decline have been based on an apparent confusion in terminology.
II. Review of Previous Work on China's Energy-Output Ratio
Changes in the energy-output ratio are usually classified into two categories. The first category is technical change, also referred to as physical intensity change or real intensity change.
Technical change is the change in the energy required to produce a particular product or the physical output of a particular sector. The second category is structural change, which includes inter alia the subcategories of final demand shift and sectoral shift. Structural change in energy use is defined as shifts in the share of total output between sectors which may be more or less energy intensive. The sectors can be broadly defined, such as agriculture, industry, and services, or can include hundreds of narrowly defined products or product groups. 1 In addition, changes in the pattern of imports and exports of goods which embody energy are often included under the category of structural change.
Early discussions of post-1977 changes in China's energy-output ratio tended to attribute most of the decline to structural change. Smil (1990) and Kambara (1992) came to this conclusion based on the observed shifts in output from heavy to light industry during the 1980s.
Studies using more rigorous analytical methodologies have placed more weight on technical change. Huang (1993) used a Divisia index for six industrial sectors and three energy inputs.
His analysis attributed 73-87% of the decline in aggregate energy intensity between 1980 and 1988 to technical change. Sinton and Levine (1994) used a Laspeyres index with a variety of data on industrial output. Their three primary data sets were prepared in multiple aggregations and covered various subperiods between 1980 and 1990. They analyzed changes in total energy use rather than disaggregating the energy inputs. Their analysis attributed 58-85% of energy savings to technical change, depending on the data set, period analyzed, and aggregation.
Whereas the previously discussed studies were restricted to analyzing changes in energy use within industry alone, Lin and Polenske (1995) and Lin (1996) (Lin and Polenske 1995, p. 81) . In the aggregate, structural changes were actually responsible for a slight increase in energy intensity.
Despite the empirical evidence that technical change was the primary cause of the fall in the energy-output ratio after 1977, the World Bank (1994, p. 3; 1997, p. 47) Bank report draws attributes structural change at very fine levels of aggregation (e.g. shifts from low quality to higher quality steel) as the greatest single source of energy savings.
Although the assertions of the World Bank and ERI appear to be at odds with the previously cited empirical research, the explanation clearly rests on the level of aggregation upon which the different studies were based. In general, for a given level of aggregation, any subsectoral reallocation of production cannot be discerned from technical change. The level of aggregation is thus of crucial importance in separating technical and structural factors in changes in the energy-output ratio. Unfortunately, it is usually not possible to assemble a complete data set (i.e. a data set with consecutive input-output tables and sectoral price deflators) at a sectoral aggregation of more than about 30 sectors and so changes below that level are attributed to technical change by default.
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III. Problems with Official Chinese Data
Before proceeding to describe our methodology for analyzing changes in the energyoutput ratio, we need to briefly discuss some problems with the relevant Chinese data. The problems center around the output data and the available price deflators. Table 1 presents GVO-GDP ratios for various aggregates. 3 The data are drawn from both Chinese statistical yearbooks and published input-output tables. The first three series are for industry only, while the fourth series includes all sectors of the economy. Although eventually arrested in some series, in general, there is an increasing trend in the GVO-GDP ratios over time. The trend is particularly marked in the second series (industrial GVO to industrial GDP in 1990 prices). In the first series (industrial GVO to industrial GDP in current prices), recent revisions to the data, shown in parentheses, seem to have stopped or even reversed the trend. 4 The third series (industrial GVO to industrial GDP from the input-output tables), also shows a halt in the general trend after 1992.
However, since we use the 1987 and 1992 input-output tables in our decompositions, we are particularly concerned about the upward tendency exhibited for those years (series three and four in the table).
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What is responsible for the observed rise in the GVO-GDP ratios? One possibility is that technical change has been material-biased. If this were the case, a shift in production processes toward the use of more material inputs and less other inputs (i.e. capital or labor) could result in an increase in the GVO-GDP ratio. A second possibility is that there has been an increase in subcontracting and/or a splitting up of previously highly vertically integrated enterprises. This process of "deverticalization" could also result in an increase in the GVO-GDP ratio. For example, an auto manufacturer may spin off a company or companies that make various auto parts. GVO, which counts all of the intermediate products separately, would rise, although the GDP of the sector would not change. A third possibility is that there are errors in the data series.
Given that GDP is probably measured with more accuracy, Rawski (1991) and Jefferson, Rawski, and Zheng (1996) cite deverticalization, new product bias, and the outright falsification of statistics as factors contributing to an overstatement of Chinese GVO data. New product bias can result when current costs are assigned to new goods for accounting reasons or when old goods are reclassified as new goods to escape price controls. Finally, outright falsification of statistics is a well known problem in China, especially for non-state enterprises and in rural areas (Korski 1998) .
These data problems make analyses that use GVO as a measure of output problematic. Table 2 compares energy-output ratios based on GDP and GVO. For industry alone, the energy to GVO ratio overstates the decline in energy intensity by about 24% compared to the corresponding industrial energy to GDP ratio. Since GDP measures what people actually consume and does not double count, it seems to be a better metric than GVO anyway.
A second problem with the Chinese data rests with the official price deflators. Two examples that illustrate some combination of understated price deflators and the previously discussed output data problems are provided in Table 3 . In the table, we compare growth in deflated GVO measures for coal and oil with their growth in physical quantities measured in tons over the period 1987 to 1992. Because of differences in coverage, we make calculations using GVO data from both the input-output tables and the statistical yearbooks. The differences in growth rates between value and physical quantities are striking. Coal output measured in 1987 yuan grew between 2 and 2.7 times faster than output measured in tons. For oil, growth in value terms was between 3.8 and 5.8 times faster. Changes in quality, for example the washing of coal to remove impurities which raise the value per ton, probably play some role in what seems to be a major overstatement of GVO growth. However, poor deflators and other inconsistencies in the GVO data likely play a much larger role in creating the discrepancies. 6 It is these types of problems that we try to take into account and adjust for in the next section.
IV. Constructing a Consistent Data Set
Our main goal in this paper is to identify the sources of the decline in the energy-output ratio in China. Because of their comprehensive, economy-wide coverage, the best sources of data for performing this analysis are the available input-output tables. However, what appears to be an overstatement of growth in real GVO, as outlined in the previous section, would render the input-output tables inconsistent across time and bias analyses made using sequential tables. In this section, we describe a method for adjusting the input-output tables to minimize the bias caused by the overstatement of GVO. In a later section, we discuss adjustments to take into account the possibility of additional errors in the price deflators.
Let A denote the input-output matrix (with n sectors), y the vector of final demand, and x the vector of GVO (both of length n). The sum of the uses of output (intermediate demand plus
final demand) equals the supply of output:
(1) Ax y x + = .
Decomposed into scalars, x i is the domestic output of good i, y i is the final demand for good i, and A ij is the amount of input i required to produce one unit of good j. 6 Sinton and Levine (1994) mention some of these problems, but do not attempt to adjust for them.
(2)
However, deverticalization cannot, and need not, be distinguished from other measurement errors (such as errors in the price deflators). We thus rewrite the above as simply:
In this framework, an example of material-biased technical change is where there is an increase in the use of "machinery" to produce "machinery." In this case, labor and capital inputs and total deliveries to final demand could remain the same, but the production process would use more intermediate inputs produced by other firms within the machinery sector. To be explicit, let j be the subscript for the machinery sector. In this example, the GVO of sector j ( x j ) and the intermediate inputs from the same sector ( A jj ) increase by the same amount, while the other
, the value added entries for j, and the deliveries to final demand ( y j ), are unchanged. Then in this case, Y is unchanged but Q is higher, resulting in a higher Q/Y ratio.
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For some industries it would be difficult to tell such a story about increased material use.
For example, in the case of crude petroleum, what does it mean to say that more "crude petroleum" is now required to produce "crude petroleum"? However, lacking sufficient a priori information on specific sectors, we correct all sectors symmetrically. We thus make a range of simple assumptions about the relative size of measurement error versus material-biased technical change. are constant for all t. Therefore, for given final demand (yt) and value added (vt) vectors in period t, we need to find a revised intermediate input matrix ( ′ A t ) and a revised output vector ( ′ x t ) such that:
where There are 3n restrictions on the ′ A matrix and ′ x vector, allowing (n 2 + n -3n) degrees of freedom. We solve the problem using methods identical to those used to interpolate input-output matrices from two benchmark tables and time series output data. We therefore minimize the sum of the squares of the weighted difference between elements of the revised matrix ′ A t and corresponding elements of the original matrix A t 9 :
, subject to (3), (4), and (5).
The results of this procedure are given in Table 4 . 10 The Next we consider a more general case where one part of the change in the Q/Y ratio, α, is due to material-biased technical change and the remainder, 1 -α, is due to various errors in the data. We repeat the above calculations after changing constraint (5) to:
10 Further details about the A′ matrix are available on request.
11 Our A matrix and x vector for 1987 are based on the official input-output table, but have been adjusted to incorporate recent revisions of GDP. The revisions mainly reflect the improved coverage of services that followed a major survey of the service sector for the years 1991-92 (Nationwide Tertiary Sector Survey Office 1995). 12 The meaning of the parameter α is discussed in the next section. When α = 0, this reduces to Case 1 (100% error). Conversely, when α = 1, all changes are assumed to be due to material-biased technical change and no adjustments are necessary.
The adjusted values for the case where α = 0.3 are reported in the last two columns of Table 3 (coal and oil), the growth rates of deflated output calculated using the adjusted GVO are now much closer to the physical quantity growth rates than with the original data. For example, for coal, the implied growth of deflated output between 1987 and 1992 is now 22% when we use the adjusted data, compared to 54% for the unadjusted output data and 20% for the physical quantity in tons.
We have repeated the adjustments for other values of α and report some of the results below. In the following section we concentrate on the case where α = 0.3. We choose to focus on this case because the growth in the adjusted value of output is then in rough accordance with the growth in the sectors for which we have some independent check through the available physical quantity data (i.e. the data on tons of coal and crude petroleum reported in Table 3 ).
Unfortunately, similar data are not available for most other sectors. We should point out that our use of one adjustment factor for all sectors is a strong assumption, but it is necessitated by the lack of obvious individual α's for each of the 29 sectors. However, one degree of flexibility is better than none.
Final Preparation of the Adjusted Matrices
The final step in preparing the input-output data set for our energy use calculations is producing the constant price 1992 matrix and making the adjusted matrix consistent with the available data on physical energy output. The physical energy output data that we assume to be correct are reported in Table 5 . Given the problems with the price deflators discussed previously, we use the growth in these physical quantities to determine the increase in real GVO between 1987 and 1992. For example, for the coal mining sector we assume that the real output, x t 2 , grows at the same rate as the total number of tons of coal mined. 13 For the crude petroleum sector (which includes a small amount of natural gas) we aggregate the quantities of crude petroleum and natural gas produced into a single "Oil&Gas Index." Since we are unable to disaggregate the sector further, the output of the electric power sector is assumed to grow at the same rate as the number of kilowatt-hours generated. The refined petroleum sector is indexed to the total number of tons of the various petroleum products produced. Again, this is not entirely satisfactory, but we believe it to be an improvement over using the unadjusted data. For completeness we also report the real GDP series.
Since we do not have similar a priori information for the real output of the non-energy sectors, we must rely on published data for our price deflators. 14 After deflating the adjusted data for the non-energy sectors using the official sectoral output price indices we found that total real final demand was 4% less than 1992 real GDP. We then scaled all sectors up by this amount so that total final demand was equal to the official figure for GDP given in the last column of Table   5 . This is equivalent to reducing all price changes between 1987 and 1992 by about 4%.
V. A Methodology for Decomposing the Change in Energy Intensity
In this section we discuss our methodology for decomposing the overall change in energy intensity into technical change (changes in production techniques as represented by the evolution of the input-output matrix) and structural change (changes in final demand patterns). Our methodology draws on the work of Lin and Polenske (1995) and Lin (1996) . Similar to Lin and Polenske, we use sequential input-output tables to decompose changes in energy intensity by energy type. However, instead of using fixed base-period shares, we use variable shares based on a Divisia index.
With time subscripts, equation (1) can be rewritten as:
The final demand vector ( y t ) can be decomposed in each period t as: We rewrite final demand for good i as a share vector of total demand ( Y t ):
We can also rewrite equations (10) and (12) as the difference between the demand for domestically produced goods and imports:
The output vector from equation (9) can be rewritten as:
As an example of what this means, consider the coal sector ( x t 2 ) in the vector ( x t ). Writing out equation (14) for this single sector gives us:
Given the large increase in the import of energy and energy-intensive goods, we analyze changes in energy use rather than energy output, which has been the measure more commonly 15 Changes in the use of commodities should include changes in inventories. We ignore inventories here for ease of exposition. Inventories are, however, included in our actual calculations.
used in previous studies. 16 For the coal sector, differentiating equation (11) 
Integrating equation (16) and R u is the approximation residual. Our formulation is similar to that used by Liu, Ang, and Ong (1992) , who also discuss other Divisia approximations. 16 The analysis here has been repeated for output alone and is available by request from the authors.
Using (15) we can rewrite equation (17) so that the change in energy intensity (i.e. the change in coal use per unit of GDP) is on the left hand side: ; and (v) changes in the level of exports of coal. Given the rapid increase in imports of energy both in raw form (e.g. crude petroleum) and embodied in energy-intensive goods (e.g. fertilizers, chemicals, and transportation services) during this period, the change in γ jt i is quite important. Finally, the use of discrete time variables results in the decomposition error R u .
We should highlight what a change in the technology term G ijt might mean. 17 One possibility is that there was a physical change in the quantity of input i used to make a ton of commodity j. A second possibility is that the shares of the sub-commodities that make up sector j have changed. For example, more cars may have been produced relative to bicycles in the transportation equipment sector, even if the energy required to make each car or bicycle remained 17 Sinton and Levine (1994) refer to this as the "real intensity." the same. Finally, there may have been new sub-commodities added to the sector (e.g. computers in the electronics sector). By definition, one cannot separate out these effects without using more disaggregated classifications. It should be noted that this problem will exist at all levels of disaggregation other than for the individual commodities themselves.
We should also point out that our Divisia formula uses the average of the initial and endpoint weights, w 0 and w T . This is in contrast to the approach taken by Lin and Polenske (1995) and Lin (1996) which is equivalent to using only the initial year weights, w 0 . Another point to note about our formulas is the relationship between the components of final demand and GDP.
In equation (12) Where real GDP appears in the calculations described above, we use the official estimates. 18 These issues are discussed in greater detail in section seven below.
VI. Decomposition of the Change in China's Energy Intensity
We can now use the methodology developed in the previous section to decompose changes in the energy-output ratio between 1987 and 1992. We calculate the individual terms in equation (19) for each of the major sources of energy: coal, crude petroleum, hydroelectricity, electric power, and refined petroleum. 19 The hydroelectric sector, which is part of the power generation sector in the input-output table, is disaggregated into a separate, artificial sector for this analysis. 20 We do this in order to be able to isolate the contribution of the other primary sources of energy --coal and crude petroleum --used in the production of electricity. Nuclear power provided only a small portion of electricity output during 1987-92 and we do not separate it out in this analysis. Although there is substantial use of biomass energy in China, it is not well documented and does not appear in the input-output tables. While a number of other researchers have added all of the sources of energy together by standard coal equivalents (sce), we do not see this as being a particularly useful measure and in our analysis we treat the sources separately. It should be noted that there is great variation in the per sce ton prices of the different types of energy. In 1992, the average price of an sce ton of raw coal was about 95 yuan, of an sce ton of crude oil about 290 yuan, and of an sce ton of wholesale electricity about 360 yuan.
The results of our decompositions of changes in energy use per yuan of GDP, corresponding to equation (19), are reported in Table 6 . The decompositions are performed using input-output tables adjusted for different assumptions about errors in the data versus material-biased technical change as described in section four. We report the results for the cases where α, the parameter that describes our assumption about the degree of material-biased technical change, is equal to 0, 0.3, and 0.5. In general, we concentrate on the case where α is equal to 0.3, which is our best guess about the degree of material-biased technical change.
In Table 6 , the first column of numbers is the overall change in the use of each type of energy per yuan of GDP between 1987 and 1992. The next six columns of numbers correspond to the terms on the right-hand side of equation (19) and break down the change in the energyoutput ratio into its component parts and the approximation residual. Except for electric power, there is a fall in the energy-output ratio for each type of energy. This holds true for all values of α. For coal, except in the case where α equals 0.5, technical change accounts for more than 100% of the fall in the energy-output ratio. 21 Technical change was partially offset by the change in demand patterns, which actually increased the use of energy per unit of GDP. Changes in import patterns and in the quantity of imports and exports all account for small decreases in the energy-output ratio. For crude petroleum, there is also a substantial fall in the energy-output ratio. A major contributor was again technical change. Changes in import patterns also contributed to the decline, however, this effect was offset by increases in the overall quantity of imports. The unusually large residual term for crude petroleum is due to the poor logarithmic approximation for the large increase in imports, which rose from 2 million tons in 1987 to 11 million tons in 1992. The changes in the use of refined petroleum are similar to those for crude petroleum. However, in the case of refined petroleum, the large amount of technical change is offset by both changes in demand patterns and in the quantity of imports.
For electric power, rather than a decline, there is actually a modest increase in the use of electricity per yuan of GDP. This can be decomposed into increases caused by a small component of negative technical change and changes in demand patterns, which are partially offset by changes in import patterns. The later implies that, ceteris paribus, less electricity was used because the imports that replaced domestic goods embodied the use of relatively more electricity. Given the size of the residual compared to the total change, we do not put much weight on these results. Similarly, given its artificial nature, we do not put much weight on the decompositions for the hydroelectric sector. Our results reflect the fact that, as show in Table 5 , the production of hydroelectricity rose by only 30% between 1987 and 1992, while total electricity output increased by 52%. intensity. Finally, we should point out that our 1992 data depend not only on our adjustment factor α, but also on our price indices. We discuss some possible problems with, and corrections to, the price indices in the next section.
As shown in Table 6 , in all of our decompositions, changes in demand patterns contributed to an increase in the energy-GDP ratio. For all energy types except electric power, this effect partially offset the decreases in energy intensity resulting from technical change. In order to try to understand the underlying reasons for the changes in demand patterns, we have assembled some data on changes in sectoral GVO and final demand in Table 8 . We have divided the sectors into primary energy, secondary energy, and non-energy sectors. The first two columns of Table 8 are data on GVO and final demand which are provided to give the reader some idea of the relative magnitude of the individual sectors and the relative importance of final demand in GVO. The later distinction is important because for a number of major users of energy, little or none of their output is consumed as final demand, but rather as intermediate inputs. Examples include chemicals, building materials, and primary metals. On the other hand, a number of sectors which do not do not consume much energy directly do consume other goods which are energy intensive. Examples include the machinery sector, which consumes a large amount of energy intensive primary metals and chemicals and the construction sector, which consumes a large amount of energy intensive building materials. The third column of Table 8 lists the cost shares of energy goods in GVO by sector. The non-energy sectors for which energy goods are a large share of the costs are mining, chemicals, building materials, primary metals, and transportation and communications. The secondary energy sectors, electric power and refined petroleum, are of course major users of primary energy goods. The effects of the electrification of the Chinese economy should be noted. The increase in the intensity of electricity use in most sectors resulted in a small overall increase in the electricity-GDP ratio. As was discussed previously, the increase in total electricity output was much faster than the increase in output from the hydroelectric sector. With the output of the hydroelectric sector not keeping pace, the increase in electricity output was met through increased coal use. Overall then, between 1987 and 1992, electrification had a "structural change" effect that resulted in an increase in the use of coal.
The next four columns of Table 8 are the shares of domestic output and imports in final demand for the years 1987 and 1992. Negative entries denote inventory reductions. The last column gives the ratios of the final demand shares for the two years. Even over this short fiveyear time span, there were some noticeable changes. The major sectors that increased in relative importance can be divided into: (i) energy intensive goods, including chemicals and building materials; and (ii) non-energy intensive goods, which include apparel, paper, metal products, machinery, transportation equipment, and commerce. Similarly, we can use the same breakdown and divide the major sectors that decreased in relative importance into: (i) energy-intensive goods, including transportation and communications; and (ii) non-energy intensive goods, including agriculture, food processing, and a number of the service sectors. The aggregate effects of these changes are seen in the positive signs on the coefficients for changes in demand patterns in Table 6 .
VII. Effects of Using Alternative Estimates of Inflation
The most important result from the decompositions described in the previous section was the importance of technical change in the fall in China's energy-output ratio. Although we made some adjustments for data problems in section four, we also mentioned that there continues to be some uncertainty about the reliability of the available price deflators. Given this uncertainty, in this section we do sensitivity analysis to see how alternative assumptions about inflation might affect our results.
In Table 9 we present results for alternative assumptions about inflation. We first present our best guess result from section six where we assumed α to be 0.3 and where our adjusted matrix was scaled to be consistent with the official real GDP figure. In the second set of figures (labeled: "Case α = 0.3, inflation adjustment = 0.0"), instead of scaling our adjusted matrix, we used the matrix which results from a strict application of the official producer price indices. In general, the net result is a decrease in the term representing the overall change in the energyoutput ratio and a corresponding decrease in the term for technical change. The other components of the decompositions are relatively unchanged.
In the final two sections of Table 9 we adjust the rate of inflation for all sectors upwards by first 1% and then 2% per year. For coal, the result of assuming a higher actual rate of inflation is a decrease in the absolute magnitude of the terms for overall change, technical change, and the residual. The other coefficients were almost unchanged. The net result is that the relative contribution of technical change actually increased. A common feature of all of the decompositions performed previously was that the change in demand patterns worked to increase the energy-output ratio. This conclusion is not affected by differing assumptions about the actual rate of inflation.
VIII. Conclusions
The decrease in the energy-output ratio in China since 1977 has been quite dramatic and has drawn considerable interest from researchers. Debate about why the ratio has been falling has centered on the relative roles of technical change within individual sectors and structural change between sectors. In this paper, we examined this question using decomposition analysis based on the two most recent input-output tables. Our major finding is that between 1987 and 1992, technical change accounted for most of the fall in the energy-GDP ratio. Structural change actually increased the use of energy, while the increased import of some energy-intensive goods had the opposite effect. The results are somewhat different for electric power, where the trend toward increased electrification of the economy resulted in an increase in the electricity-GDP ratio. Our conclusions are robust to a number of adjustments to correct for possible problems with the input-output tables and the available sectoral price deflators, which may understate the actual rate of inflation.
Our conclusions are similar to those reached by Lin and Polenske (1995) and Lin (1996) for the 1981-87 period. Although not strictly comparable because of differences in methodology and the fact that they examine industry alone, our results are also in keeping with the findings of Huang (1993) and Sinton and Levine (1994) . However, as discussed in section two, our methodology does not capture structural change effects below the 2-digit level and therefore may not contradict the World Bank (1993, 1994, 1997) and others who have asserted that this was the most important factor in the fall in the energy-output ratio. This would be the case if the structural change occurred at finer levels of aggregation than we are able to examine with the available data.
Although not the focus of this paper, in closing it may be worth briefly discussing some factors that could influence the prospects for further decline in the energy-output ratio in China.
First, at the beginning of economic reform the Chinese economy was technologically backward and extremely inefficient in the use of energy. Hence many of the easily available efficiency gains may have already been realized. Second, by 1978 China was already quite industrialized.
Between 1978 and 1995, the share of industry in GDP changed only slightly, rising from 48% to 49% (State Statistical Bureau 1997) . Further development of the service sector, which grew from 24% of GDP to 31% over the same period, may serve to reduce energy intensity in the future. However, this effect could be reduced if there were a rapid increase in household demand for motor vehicles. Third, during the period we examined, energy prices were still under a considerable degree of government control. Great strides in energy price reform were made during the early 1990s, but they are still uncompleted. Higher prices may continue to drive energy-saving technological change. This effect would be strengthened if the government were to increase environmental taxes, which are already collected in limited measure for some air pollutants, to more fully account for the externalities caused by the use of fossil fuels. On the other hand, low world oil prices would have the opposite effect. The examination of these issues would provide many topics for future research. Figures in parenthesis include the most recently published GVO data series revisions.
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